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Courts-Federal Jurisdiction-Res Judicata Applied
to Determination of
Menashe v. Sutton1 had been instituted in a federal district court,
and Sutton's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction had been over-
ruled. This ruling was not appealed. During the proceedings petitioner
had refused to testify, and consequently was committed for contempt.
In United States ex rel. Sutton v. Mulcahy,2 petitioner by habeas corpus
sought to reopen the issue of jurisdiction which had been determined in
Menashe v. Sutton. In its decision the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held: even assuming that the district court had not had jurisdiction,3
in the absence of special circumstances, the lower court's determination
that it did have jurisdiction was immune from collateral attack. No
special circumstances were here found.
This decision extends the holding in United States v. Jaeger.4
There the petitioner was denied habeas corpus because he had failed
to appeal the very order for violation of which he was committed for
contempt. Here the order which petitioner had violated was not even
appealable. 5 His error was in not appealing from the court's decision
that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, a decision prior to and only
indirectly related to the order which he violated. The two cases are
otherwise substantially similar. Neither has been reviewed by the Su-
preme Court. They raise the question whether res judicata should be
applied where the attack on jurisdiction, though technically collateral,
arises directly out of the original action.
It is now well established that res judicata applies to jurisdictional
as well as to other judicial determinations where the attack is by a sub-
sequent unrelated action.6  Stoll v. Gottlieb7 applied it where the issue
171 F. Supp. 103 (S. D. N. Y. 1947).
2169 F. 2d 94 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
'Jurisdiction depended on constitutionality of the amendment extending diver-
sity of citizenship privileges to citizens of the territories and the District of
Columbia, 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), as amended, 54 STAT. 143 (1940), 28 U. S. C.
§41(1) (b) (1946). The amendment was held unconstitutional in National Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 165 F. 2d 531 (C. C. A. 4th 1947), cert.
granted, 68 Sup. Ct. 746 (1948).
1117 F. 2d 483 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
'Petitioner had applied for a stay of the order to testify pending appeal from
it, but the application was denied by the circuit court of appeals on the ground
that the order was interlocutory and hence not appealable. United States ex rel.
Sutton v. Mulcahy, 169 F. 2d 94 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
'Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183 (1947) ; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 (1940); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66(1940) ; Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938); cf. Baldwin v. Iowa State
Travelling Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522 (1930) ; Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U. S.
327 (1893) ; Des Moines Navigation Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U. S. 255(1887). But cf. Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U. S. 348
(1920) (bankruptcy court declared insurance company an involuntary bankrupt in
spite of an express statutory exemption; held not res judicata, but null and void,
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of jurisdiction had been actually contested in the prior action, and
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Banks applied it where
the court had impliedly determined its jurisdiction by assuming to hear
the case. In both of these cases a bankruptcy court had determined that
it had jurisdiction to dispose of certain rights of bondholders under a
reorganization plan. Plaintiffs, though they had been parties to the
bankruptcy proceedings, had not appealed. Later when they tried to
raise the question of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction in an inde-
pendent unrelated action on the bonds, the Supreme Court held in both
cases that the prior determination of jurisdiction, though wrong, was
res judicata. These cases differ from the instant case in that here the
attack, although it arose in a petition for habeas corpus, and so, strictly
viewed, was a collateral attack, was from a practical standpoint sub-
sidiary to the action out of which it originated.9 Thus the rule of the
principal case extends res judicata a little further into the field of juris-
dictional determinations than did previous decisions.
The court in the Sutton case emphasized that habeas corpus is still
available under exceptional circumstances even when the issue of juris-
diction has been determined and no appeal taken.' 0 This is in accord
with expressed views of the Supreme Court." It is not yet altogether
clear just what will be considered exceptional circumstances, as the
qualification has rarely been invoked in order to grant the writ.12 More
though the company had cooperated with the trustee in bankruptcy throughout
his administration).
305 U. S. 165 (1938) (bankruptcy court released guarantor from liability on
corporate bonds, an act in excess of its jurisdiction).
308 U. S. 371 (1940) (jurisdiction of a corporate reorganization was based
on a statute subsequently held unconstitutional).
' In view of the close relation of the two actions, would it not be proper as
well as more consistent with the courts' express recognition of exceptions under
special circumstances, to consider them within the framework of a single action
and therefore apply law of the case principles instead of strict res judicata? The
practical result would be substantially the same, but law of the case, being a
practice of courts rather than a binding rule, allows the necessary flexibility with-
out interfering with the usual absolute quality of res judicata. Messinger v. Ander-
son, 255 U. S. 436 (1911). The courts, however, have not discussed law of the
case in decisions on such actions.
"0 United States ex rel. Sutton v. Mulcahy, 169 F. 2d 94, 96 (1948) ("Although
the writ may still be availed of, despite neglect to appeal, in exceptional cases, we
do not think the present is such a case.").
" E.g., Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 27 (1939) ("... the rule is not so
inflexible that it may not yield to exceptional circumstances where the need for
the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent").2 E.g., United States ex rel. Stabler v. Watkins, 168 F. 2d 883 (C. C. A. 9th
1948) (default judgment cancelling a citizen's naturalization papers was based onjurisdiction gained by service of summons to a place ascertained to be his resi-
dence by hearsay affidavits only) ; Bowen v. Johnston, supra note 11 (jurisdiction
depended on whether the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over terri-
tory ceded by Georgia, and conflicting state statutes had to be construed to deter-
mine the answer).
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often the courts have recognized the qualification only to point out that
exceptional circumstances do not exist.'8
One other limitation of the rule of the principal case might be im-
plied from the fact that in the cases thus far decided where jurisdiction
was held res judicata in the face of a collateral attack arising directly
out of the original action, the issue of jurisdiction had been actually con-
tested at the earlier stage.14 The question is open whether a mere
assumption of jurisdiction without actual contest would be res judicata
when so attacked. The general rule is that res judicata applies as well
where an issue might have been contested as where it was a real issue.',
There is authority, however, indicating that whether or not jurisdiction
was actually contested would be a factor in determining whether or
not the circumstances were sufficiently exceptional to warrant allowing
collateral attack.16
United States v. United Mine Workers17 should next be considered,
because it, like the Sutton case, deals with contempt committed in the
course of proceedings to which defendant was a party where the de-
fense was that the court had no jurisdiction. The court issued a tem-
porary anti-strike injunction in order to preserve the status quo until
it could exercise its power to determine whether or not it had juris-
diction to make the order permanent. The injunction was violated.
The Supreme Court, in its opinion in the contempt prosecution, found
that the lower court had actually been within its jurisdiction, but stated
as an alternative holding that even if it had not actually possessed the
requisite jurisdiction to make the order, the court was entitled to
enforce obedience to the temporary injunction as the only means avail-
able to assure it the effective power to determine its own jurisdiction.
Therefore the court held that disobedience of the temporary injunction
was contempt without regard to whether or not the court had juris-
diction. The present case differs in that here there was no necessity
" Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 179 (1947) (". . the situations in which
habeas corpus has done service for an' appeal are the exceptions . . . habeas
corpus is increasingly denied in case an appellate procedure was available for
correction of the error." Here the petitioner had not appealed because of a pre-
vailing view, founded on interpretation of a Supreme Court decision, that appeal
was not available under the circumstances. After the time for appeal had expired,
a later Supreme Court decision showed that the earlier interpretation had been
wrong. Habeas corpus denied; not exceptional circumstances).
" In Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19 (1939), the issue was assumed without
actual contest, but since exceptional circumstances were found it is not clear what
significance would be given to the fact taken alone.
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183 (1947), Note, 26 N. C. L. REv. 60 (1947);
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940).
" RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, §10(2) (d) ("Among the factors appropriate to
be considered in determining that collateral attack should be permitted are . . .
the question of jurisdiction was not actually litigated."). But see id. §10(2) (d),
comment (c).17330 U. S. 258 (1947).
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of preserving the court's power to determine its own jurisdiction; that
power had been exercised. Further, the nature of the case differs sub-
stantially from a labor injunction case, in which time is of the essence;
here no urgent necessity compelled the court to enforce the order re-
gardless of whether or not it was based on proper jurisdictional facts.
Thus the Mine Workers case does not seem applicable to the circum-
stances of the principal case. It leaves open, so far as the Supreme Court
is concerned, whether res judicata should be extended to a collateral
attack on jurisdiction which arises directly out of the original action,
where no such necessity exists.
There is no doubt that the Sutton case represents a logical develop-
ment in the line of cases which in the past decade have extended res
judicata into the previously exempt field of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.'8 Jurisdiction as so used should be distinguished from the lack
of jurisdiction to issue a particular order which may result from devel-
opments in the course of the trial. It is confined to decisions by a court
on its initial jurisdiction to conduct the litigation. So construed the
extension of res judicata to jurisdictional determinations seems a wise
policy. It places no restraint on the use of c6llateral attack where there
has been no hearing which meets the requirements of due process. 19
Nor does it preclude collateral attack by a person not a party to the
original action, who had no right of appeal from the first determination.
20
It merely requires that a person who was a party to the original action
proceed in the orderly course of law with his appellate remedies in the
case of a jurisdictional determination just as he would be required to
do in the case of any other judicial decision. Use of habeas corpus to
attack a jurisdictional determination is eliminated unless there are ex-
ceptional circumstances outweighing the policy favoring cessation of
litigation. This appears reasonable, as there is no generally applicable
rule which requires special treatment for decisions on jurisdiction. The
requirements of justice are met when a defendant has had a trial with
all the protection afforded by the due process provision of the Con-
stitution, before an impartial tribunal, and with full opportunity for
appeal. In the absence of exceptional circumstances there appears no
reason why, having acquiesced until the time for appeal had expired, a
'8 See note 6 supra.
10 Towensend v. Burke, 68 Sup. Ct. 1252 (1948) (lack of counsel under circum-
stances which showed that defendant had been taken advantage of by the prosecu-
tion; habeas corpus granted) ; Wade v. Mayo, 68 Sup. Ct. 1270 (1948) (no counsel
for eighteen-year-old defendant who was unable to adequately represent himself;
habeas corpus granted).
20 Fetzer v. Johnson, 15 F. 2d 145 (C. C. A. 8th 1926). Quaere whether a
witness with a statutory right of appeal would be bound if he failed to exercise
that right?
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person should be heard to complain that he was tried by the wrong
court.21
ELIZABETH 0. ROLLINS.
Courts-Venue--Attempts to Limit Venue Provisions of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act
Congress has provided a special venue statute for cases arising under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act which permits the employee to
sue (1) at the residence of the defendant, (2) where the cause of action
arose, or (3) where the railroad is doing business.' Many employees
have used the third provision as a means of "shopping" for an ad-
vantageous forum, or as a means of forcing railroads to compromise
suits rather than defend in a forum which, although technically proper,
is highly inconvenient to the railroad. The railroads have attempted
to avoid the burdens of such suits by various means, the most re-
cent of which has been a contract with the injured employee limiting
the venue. There had been a conflict in the district courts2 as to the
validity of this type of contract, but recently the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals decided that such an agreement is void under Section 5 of the
FELA as an attempt by the railroad to exempt itself from liability
under the Act.3 The court looked to the history of the special venue
provisions and concluded that they are an inherent part of the employ-
er's liability. Thus, the latest device to narrow these troublesome pro-
visions has failed.
It is important to note at the outset the purpose of the special venue
statute of the FELA. Originally the venue of actions under that Act
was governed by the general provisions applicable to federal courts. In
" There was a peculiarity in the Sutton case which has not been mentioned,
viz., the petition for habeas corpus was brought within the time allowed for appeal.
It would be rare that counsel would make such an error, but where, as here, it
occurs, it seems to penalize the petitioner unduly for his attorney's error in choice
of remedies to refuse to consider the jurisdictional objection because of the guise
in which it was introducd. See Circuit Judge Frank, dissenting in United States
ex rel. Sutton v. Mulcahy, 169 F. 2d 94 (1948) ("I see no reason why irrational
procedural formalism, judicial red-tape-ism, yielding injustice, should not be re-
pudiated in the appellate process, when no statute stands in the way.").
'36 STAT. 291 §6 (1910), 45 U. S. C. §56 (1946).
2 Holding such contracts valid on the theory that venue is merely the place of
enforcing liability are: Roland v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 65 F. Supp. 630
(N. D. Ill. 1946); Herrington v. Thompson, 61 F. Supp. 903 (W. D. Mo. 1945);
Clark v. Lowden, 48 F. Supp. 261 (D. Minn. 1942); Detwiler v. Lowden, 198
Minn. 185, 269 N. W. 367 (1936). Holding such contracts invalid are: Krenger
v. Pennsylvania R. R., 8 F. R. D. 65 (E. D. N. Y. 1947) ; Fleming v. Husted, 68
F. Supp. 900 (S. D. Iowa 1946); Sherman v. Pere Marquette Ry., 62 F. Supp.
590 (N. D. I1. 1945) ("The beneficial effects of the statute should not be
whittled away by the courts by distinguishing between adjective and substantive
rights. . . ."); Peterson v. Ogden U. Ry., 110 Utah 573, 175 P. 2d 744 (1946).
Compare Porter v. Fleming, 74 F. Supp. 378 (D. Minn. 1947).
'Akerly v. New York C. R. R., 68 F. 2d 812 (C. C. A. 6th 1948).
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